In these states, the "actual physical control" language is construed as intending "to deter individuals who have been drinking intoxicating liquor from getting into their vehicles, except as passengers. " FN6] Still, some generalizations are valid. The court said: "An intoxicated person seated behind the steering wheel of an automobile is a threat to the safety and welfare of the public. In Alabama, "actual physical control" was initially defined as "exclusive physical power, and present ability, to operate, move, park, or direct whatever use or non-use is to be made of the motor vehicle at the moment. " When the occupant is totally passive, has not in any way attempted to actively control the vehicle, and there is no reason to believe that the inebriated person is imminently going to control the vehicle in his or her condition, we do not believe that the legislature intended for criminal sanctions to apply. Cagle v. Mr. robinson was quite ill recently done. City of Gadsden, 495 So. This view, at least insofar as it excuses a drunk driver who was already driving but who subsequently relinquishes control, might be subject to criticism as encouraging drunk drivers to test their skills by attempting first to drive before concluding that they had better not.
Key v. Town of Kinsey, 424 So. The Arizona Court of Appeals has since clarified Zavala by establishing a two-part test for relinquishing "actual physical control"--a driver must "place his vehicle away from the road pavement, outside regular traffic lanes, and... Mr. robinson was quite ill recently online. turn off the ignition so that the vehicle's engine is not running. 2d 735 (1988), discussed supra, where the court concluded that evidence of the ignition key in the "on" position, the glowing alternator/battery light, the gear selector in "drive, " and the warm engine, sufficiently supported a finding that the defendant had actually driven his car shortly before the officer's arrival. Rather, each must be considered with an eye towards whether there is in fact present or imminent exercise of control over the vehicle or, instead, whether the vehicle is merely being used as a stationary shelter.
The policy of allowing an intoxicated individual to "sleep it off" in safety, rather than attempt to drive home, arguably need not encompass the privilege of starting the engine, whether for the sake of running the radio, air conditioning, or heater. Those were the facts in the Court of Special Appeals' decision in Gore v. State, 74 143, 536 A. In this instance, the context is the legislature's desire to prevent intoxicated individuals from posing a serious public risk with their vehicles. 3] We disagree with this construction of "actual physical control, " which we consider overly broad and excessively rigid. Neither the statute's purpose nor its plain language supports the result that intoxicated persons sitting in their vehicles while in possession of their ignition keys would, regardless of other circumstances, always be subject to criminal penalty. Webster's also defines "control" as "to exercise restraining or directing influence over. " Indeed, once an individual has started the vehicle, he or she has come as close as possible to actually driving without doing so and will generally be in "actual physical control" of the vehicle. 2d 1144, 1147 (Ala. 1986). Id., 136 Ariz. 2d at 459. Mr. robinson was quite ill recently said. Thus, our construction of "actual physical control" as permitting motorists to "sleep it off" should not be misconstrued as encouraging motorists to try their luck on the roadways, knowing they can escape arrest by subsequently placing their vehicles "away from the road pavement, outside regular traffic lanes, and... turn[ing] off the ignition so that the vehicle's engine is not running. " Quoting Hughes v. State, 535 P. 2d 1023, 1024 ()) (both cases involved defendant seated behind the steering wheel of vehicle parked partially in the roadway with the key in the ignition).
Because of the varying tests and the myriad factual permutations, synthesizing or summarizing the opinions of other courts appears futile. No one factor alone will necessarily be dispositive of whether the defendant was in "actual physical control" of the vehicle. The court said: "We can expect that most people realize, as they leave a tavern or party intoxicated, that they face serious sanctions if they drive. For example, a person asleep on the back seat, under a blanket, might not be found in "actual physical control, " even if the engine is running. More recently, the Alabama Supreme Court abandoned this strict, three-pronged test, adopting instead a "totality of the circumstances test" and reducing the test's three prongs to "factors to be considered. " And while we can say that such people should have stayed sober or planned better, that does not realistically resolve this all-too-frequent predicament. In the words of a dissenting South Dakota judge, this construction effectively creates a new crime, "Parked While Intoxicated. " The question, of course, is "How much broader? Position of the person charged in the driver's seat, behind the steering wheel, and in such condition that, except for the intoxication, he or she is physically capable of starting the engine and causing the vehicle to move; 3. The same court later explained that "actual physical control" was "intending to prevent intoxicated drivers from entering their vehicles except as passengers or passive occupants as in Bugger.... " Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 P. 2d 651, 654 (Utah 1982) (emphasis added).
For example, on facts much akin to those of the instant case, the Supreme Court of Wyoming held that a defendant who was found unconscious in his vehicle parked some twenty feet off the highway with the engine off, the lights off, and the key in the ignition but off, was in "actual physical control" of the vehicle. The court concluded that "while the defendant remained behind the wheel of the truck, the pulling off to the side of the road and turning off the ignition indicate that defendant voluntarily ceased to exercise control over the vehicle prior to losing consciousness, " and it reversed his conviction. In Zavala, an officer discovered the defendant sitting unconscious in the driver's seat of his truck, with the key in the ignition, but off. Petersen v. Department of Public Safety, 373 N. 2d 38, 40 (S. 1985) (Henderson, J., dissenting). Comm'r, 425 N. 2d 370 (N. 1988), in turn quoting Martin v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 358 N. 2d 734, 737 ()); see also Berger v. District of Columbia, 597 A. Denied, 429 U. S. 1104, 97 1131, 51 554 (1977). We have no such contrary indications here, so we examine the ordinary meaning of "actual physical control. " As we have already said with respect to the legislature's 1969 addition of "actual physical control" to the statute, we will not read a statute to render any word superfluous or meaningless. Further, when interpreting a statute, we assume that the words of the statute have their ordinary and natural meaning, absent some indication to the contrary. At least one state, Idaho, has a statutory definition of "actual physical control. " Accordingly, a person is in "actual physical control" if the person is presently exercising or is imminently likely to exercise "restraining or directing influence" over a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition.
Webster's also contrasts "actual" with "potential and possible" as well as with "hypothetical. In those rare instances where the facts show that a defendant was furthering the goal of safer highways by voluntarily 'sleeping it off' in his vehicle, and that he had no intent of moving the vehicle, trial courts should be allowed to find that the defendant was not 'in actual physical control' of the vehicle.... ". Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1706 (1986) defines "physical" as "relating to the body... often opposed to mental. " Other factors may militate against a court's determination on this point, however. In People v. Cummings, 176 293, 125 514, 517, 530 N. 2d 672, 675 (1988), the Illinois Court of Appeals also rejected a reading of "actual physical control" which would have prohibited intoxicated persons from entering their vehicles to "sleep it off. " The engine was off, although there was no indication as to whether the keys were in the ignition or not. See, e. g., State v. Woolf, 120 Idaho 21, 813 P. 2d 360, 362 () (court upheld magistrate's determination that defendant was in driver's position when lower half of defendant's body was on the driver's side of the front seat, his upper half resting across the passenger side). 2d 407, 409 (D. C. 1991) (stating in dictum that "[e]ven a drunk with the ignition keys in his pocket would be deemed sufficiently in control of the vehicle to warrant conviction. While the preferred response would be for such people either to find alternate means of getting home or to remain at the tavern or party without getting behind the wheel until sober, this is not always done. Superior Court for Greenlee County, 153 Ariz. 2d at 152 (citing Zavala, 136 Ariz. 2d at 459). One can discern a clear view among a few states, for example, that "the purpose of the 'actual physical control' offense is [as] a preventive measure, " State v. Schuler, 243 N. W. 2d 367, 370 (N. D. 1976), and that " 'an intoxicated person seated behind the steering wheel of a motor vehicle is a threat to the safety and welfare of the public. '
As a practical matter, we recognize that any definition of "actual physical control, " no matter how carefully considered, cannot aspire to cover every one of the many factual variations that one may envision. The danger is less than that involved when the vehicle is actually moving; however, the danger does exist and the degree of danger is only slightly less than when the vehicle is moving. V. Sandefur, 300 Md. We therefore join other courts which have rejected an inflexible test that would make criminals of all people who sit intoxicated in a vehicle while in possession of the vehicle's ignition keys, without regard to the surrounding circumstances. 2d 701, 703 () (citing State v. Purcell, 336 A. Courts pursuing this deterrence-based policy generally adopt an extremely broad view of "actual physical control. " Adams v. State, 697 P. 2d 622, 625 (Wyo. We believe that, by using the term "actual physical control, " the legislature intended to differentiate between those inebriated people who represent no threat to the public because they are only using their vehicles as shelters until they are sober enough to drive and those people who represent an imminent threat to the public by reason of their control of a vehicle. As long as such individuals do not act to endanger themselves or others, they do not present the hazard to which the drunk driving statute is directed.
Courts must in each case examine what the evidence showed the defendant was doing or had done, and whether these actions posed an imminent threat to the public. ' " State v. Schwalk, 430 N. 2d 317, 319 (N. 1988) (quoting Buck v. North Dakota State Hgwy. We believe no such crime exists in Maryland. The court defined "actual physical control" as " 'existing' or 'present bodily restraint, directing influence, domination or regulation, ' " and held that "the defendant at the time of his arrest was not controlling the vehicle, nor was he exercising any dominion over it. " Thus, rather than assume that a hazard exists based solely upon the defendant's presence in the vehicle, we believe courts must assess potential danger based upon the circumstances of each case. Thus, we must give the word "actual" some significance. The location of the vehicle can be a determinative factor in the inquiry because a person whose vehicle is parked illegally or stopped in the roadway is obligated by law to move the vehicle, and because of this obligation could more readily be deemed in "actual physical control" than a person lawfully parked on the shoulder or on his or her own property. Even the presence of such a statutory definition has failed to settle the matter, however. We believe that the General Assembly, particularly by including the word "actual" in the term "actual physical control, " meant something more than merely sleeping in a legally parked vehicle with the ignition off.
In Garcia, the court held that the defendant was in "actual physical control" and not a "passive occupant" when he was apprehended while in the process of turning the key to start the vehicle. The Supreme Court of Ohio, for example, defined "actual physical control" as requiring that "a person be in the driver's seat of a vehicle, behind the steering wheel, in possession of the ignition key, and in such condition that he is physically capable of starting the engine and causing the vehicle to move. "
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